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POLICY CHALLENGE
In the short run, Europe needs more labour mobility between EU member
states given excessively high unemployment reported in some regions,
while others face a shortage of skills. In the long run this will not be suffi-
cient to close gaps in European labour markets. But many Europeans are
not ready to accept more international migrants, and give their support to
political parties with restrictive agendas. This creates at least three chal-
lenges. First: organising political majorities in favour of more proactive
migration policies. Second:
making Europe more attrac-
tive for mobile people with
talent and skills. Third:
moving away from unilateral
migration policies towards
negotiated win-win solu-
tions aiming at reducing the
costs of, and enhancing the
welfare gains from, migra-
tion and remittances.
Future labour market demand? Working-age
population change 2010-50 (%), selected regions
THE ISSUE In an ageing world with demographic and economic imbalances,
the number of international migrants is likely to rise during the twenty-first
century. The geography of migration flows is changing, however. Mobile
people will be increasingly attracted by faster-growing economies. There-
fore, some traditional destinations in western Europe will face stronger
competition for skilled labour – not least from countries like China where
the working-age population will shrink after 2020. At the same time, the
sentiment in many European receiving societies is turning against migra-
tion and intra-European Union mobility. 
Source: Bruegel based on UN. Note: working-age population = 20-64. See Figure 1 on page 4.
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1. ‘Popular initiative:
against mass immigra-
tion’, see
http://www.admin.ch/ch
/d/pore/vi/vis413t.html.
THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION is changing. Europe
(including Russia) remains the
most significant destination for
migrants, hosting almost a third
(31 percent) of all international
migrants (72 million out of a total
of 232 million; see Table 2 on the
next page). But more economies
will soon enter the global race for
talent and skills. China, for exam-
ple, is already actively searching
for highly qualified experts from
abroad, although numbers are
still relatively small.
At the same time, economic
growth has shifted from the
advanced economies to middle-
income and low-income countries,
making many traditionally immi-
grant-receiving countries less
attractive for migrant workers and
their families. The momentum of
global ageing is also set to shift to
today's emerging markets –
namely China and Latin America.
Europe faces a situation in which,
in the short term, it will have to
address high unemployment in
some parts of the continent, and a
shortage of labour and skills in
others, while in the medium and
long terms, because of ageing
societies and stagnating or
declining working age popula-
tions, it will need to invest more in
sound, forward-looking migration
policies. Current policies are often
uncoordinated with little coopera-
tion among EU member states or
between migrant-sending and
migrant-receiving countries.
Furthermore, anti-immigration
sentiment is growing in some
European countries. Populist par-
ties throughout Europe gain
ground by focusing on the issue.
The February 2014 referendum in
Switzerland1 showed that free-
dom of movement within Europe
is no longer backed by a majority
of Swiss voters. The same is most
likely true for the United Kingdom
and maybe a few other EU states.
This Policy Brief provides an
overview of global migration
trends and how the dynamics of
international migration are chang-
ing. It then considers how Europe
needs to respond – both in terms
of making the internal labour
market more efficient, and in
terms of managing the shifts in
international migration.
GLOBAL MIGRATION TRENDS
There are 7.2 billion people living
on our planet, mainly in the
middle- and low-income countries
of the global South. Less than 20
percent live in high-income coun-
tries of the global North (see Table
1 for definitions). An estimated
232 million people, or 3 percent of
the global population, are interna-
tional migrants – defined as
people living outside their coun-
try of birth (see UN DESA, 2012).
Of these 232 million international
migrants, an estimated 164 mil-
lion, or 71 percent, were born in
middle- and low-income countries
the global South; about half of
these, 82 million, have moved to
other countries in the global
South. The other 82 million have
moved to rich countries of the
global North (Table 1). 
Another 63 million international
migrants (29 percent) have their
roots in rich countries of the
global North. Most of them, 53
million, have moved to another
rich country. As a result there are
now an estimated 135 million
international migrants (58 per-
cent of all international migrants)
living in richer countries of the
northern hemisphere (Table 1).  
Since 1990, the number of inter-
national migrants has increased
by 76 million (+49 percent).
Table 1: International migrants by origin and destination, global North/South, 2013
Origin North Origin South Total by destination
Immigrants in % of
population of
receiving region
Destination North 54 million (22%) 82 million (36%) 136 million (58%) 11.3%
Destination South 14 million (6%) 82 million (36%) 96 million (42%) 1.5%
Total by origin 68 million (28%) 164 million (72%) 232 million (=100%) 3.0%
Emigrants in % of population
of sending region
5.2% 2.5% 3.0%
Source: UN DESA 2012, 2013a. Note: International migrants are defined as people not residing in their country of birth irrespective of their citi-
zenship. In line with definitions used by the United Nations, the term ‘North’ refers to countries and regions traditionally classified for statistical
purposes as ‘developed’ or ‘high income’. The developed regions include Europe, Japan, North America (Canada, US), Australia, New Zealand. The
term ‘South’ first of all refers to those countries classified as ‘developing’ or ‘middle- and low-income’. The South, however, also includes a few
high-income countries: the Gulf States, Israel and Singapore.
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2. Another 2.7 million
international migrants
live in EU-associated
countries: Iceland,
Liechtenstein, Norway,
Switzerland (=EEA +
EFTA).
3. Calculation based on
UN DESA (2012), OECD
(2013), and Eurostat
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.
europa.eu/statistics_ex
plained/index.php/Migr
ation_and_migrant_popul
ation_statistics).
Europe (including Russia) is the
most important migrant
destination. Only 52 percent of its
72 million migrants come from
other European countries. Almost
the same number of international
migrants resides in Asia (70.8
million), with a large majority
coming from other Asian
countries. North America (53
million) is home to about a fifth of
all migrants (Table 2). Within
Europe  49 million international
migrants reside in the member
states of the European Union2, of
which less than a third have
moved from another EU country,
while two thirds have come from
third countries3. 
GLOBAL POPULATION TRENDS
Since 2000, the world population
has increased by 77 million
people (or about 1.1 percent) per
year (UN DESA, 2013b). The
growth rate will decline during the
next few decades, though global
population is projected to grow for
another 50-70 years, reaching
9.6 billion in 2050 (see UN DESA,
2013b). Most population growth
will be concentrated in South Asia,
the Middle East and sub-Saharan
Africa (UN DESA, 2013b; UNFPA,
2013). At the same time, in some
regions and countries, especially
in the global North, population
growth has already ended, and an
increasing number of countries
will experience stagnating or even
declining populations.
The main reason for the declining
rate of global population growth is
the shrinking number of children
per family (see UNFPA, 2013). At
first this translates into fewer
births and smaller cohorts of pre-
school and school children.
Eventually, the size of the work-
ing-age population also starts to
shrink. 
In Japan, Russia and South Korea
the domestic labour force is
already contracting. Europe will
experience the same within ten
years, and China will begin to see
its working-age population
decline after 2020. In Latin Amer-
ica the working-age population
will start declining after the year
2045. Meanwhile, working-age
populations will continue to grow
in South Asia, the Middle East and
Africa (Figure 1 on the next page). 
Table 2: International migrants by macro region of origin and destination, 2013
Origin, absolute
num
ber
(m
illions)
As % of all inter-
national
em
igrants
Em
igrants
rem
aining in the
sam
e m
acro
region, %
Destination,
absolute
num
ber,
m
illions
As % of all
international
im
m
igrants
Im
m
igrants
com
ing from
 the
sam
e m
acro
region, %
Africa 31.3 13.5 49 18.6 8.0 82
Asia 92.5 40.0 58 70.8 30.6 76
Europe 58.4 25.2 65 72.4 31.3 52
Latin America 36.7 15.9 15 8.5 3.7 64
North America 4.3 1.9 28 53.1 22.9 2
Oceania 1.9 0.8 58 7.9 3.5 42
N/A 6.4 2.7
Total 231.5 100 100
Source: UN DESA, 2012, 2013a. Note: Europe includes Russia and other successor states of the former Soviet Union. 
During this period, the number of
international migrants born in the
South and residing in the North
increased from 40 to 82 million
(+105 percent) while the migrant
population originating in the
global South and living in other
countries of the South grew from
59 million to 82 million (+41 per-
cent). The number of international
migrants born in the North and
residing in other rich countries of
the North only grew from 41 to 54
million (+32 per cent) (UN DESA,
2013a). 
In contrast to its role in global
demographic growth, the global
North still plays an important role
in the dynamics of international
migration. People born in richer
countries are more likely to live in
another country (5.2 percent)
than people born in the global
South (2.5 percent). In absolute
terms as well as relative to their
populations, the richer countries
of the North attract more interna-
tional migrants. In the richer
countries of the Northern hemi-
sphere, 11 percent of people are
foreign-born, compared to only
1.5 percent in the global South
(Table 1).  
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Japan and the countries of west-
ern Europe currently have the
oldest populations, followed by
North America, Australia, central
Europe and Russia. But soon the
momentum of global aging will
shift to today’s emerging markets
– namely to China and Latin
America. These developments are
highly predictable, but many
countries are not well prepared for
rapidly ageing societies and
declining working-age popula-
tions. A number of experts
assume that this will have a nega-
tive impact on economic growth,
citing Japan as the most promi-
nent example. At the same time
declining working-age popula-
tions might create additional
demand for migrant labour and
skills4. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
GEOGRAPHY OF INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION
What does this changing pattern
mean for international migration
and mobility in the next few
decades? 
• The global race for talent and
skills will get tougher as more
countries actively search for
highly qualified experts from
abroad. China has started to do
this, although migration into
China is still relatively limited.
China’s declining working-age
population might also create a
demand for semi-skilled and
low-skilled labour, effectively
turning it from a migrant-send-
ing into an immigrant-receiving
country, competing with
Europe, North America and
Australia for workers and skills.
• Economic growth has shifted
from the advanced economies
to middle-income and low-
income countries. In case this
shift persists, the narrowing of
existing income gaps will have
practical implications for the
migration patterns of the
future. 
• Empirical analysis for the first
decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury shows that on average
only countries with a gross
national income (GNI) per
capita below US$ 9,000 had a
negative migration balance
(average annual net flows; see
Figure 2)5. As GNI in many
middle- and low-income coun-
tries increases, sending
countries will be turned into
destination countries.  
• In countries where GNI per
capita exceeds US$ 15,000,
net migration balances on
average are positive (Figure
2)6. However, many immigrant-
receiving countries of the
North are encountering slow
economic growth or even
recession, and unemployment
rates are well above historical
averages. This makes them
less attractive for migrant
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
19
50
19
60
19
70
19
80
19
90
20
00
20
10
20
20
20
30
20
40
20
50
India
Sub-Saharan Africa
China
Europe
Latin America
USA/Canada
Northern Africa
Working-age population (ages 20-64, millons)
Source: Bruegel based on UN World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision.
Figure 1: Change in working-age population, 1950-2050
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Source: Bruegel based on United Nations and World Bank data (N = 170 countries).
Note: Average annual net migration rates for 2005-10 per 1,000 inhabitants grouped
by average annual GNI per capita (2005-10) of respective countries.
Figure 2: Average net migration balances (net flows) by average
annual GNI per capita (US$), 2005-10
4. It should be noted,
however, that in Japan,
which has the world’s
oldest population and
reports a shrinking
working age population
since the 1990s, this
has not been the case
so far.
5. Of the countries with
GNI per capita below
US$3,000 and the
countries with GNI per
capita between
US$3,000 and
US$9,000, 83 percent
and 68 percent respec-
tively had a negative
migration balance
(2005-10).
6. Among the countries
with GNI per capita
between US$9,000 and
US$15,000, only 30
percent had a negative
migration balance, and
among the countries
with GNI per capita
above US$15,000, only
one had a negative
migration balance
(2005-10). A more
complex model of the
relationship can be
found in Hatton and
Williamson (2005).
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7. The UN Population
Projection even
assumes that interna-
tional migration (at
least in net terms) will
gradually disappear by
the end of the twenty-
first century.
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pled with high unemployment.
For citizens of these countries,
emigration to neighbouring
countries and oversees desti-
nations will continue to be a
welfare-enhancing alternative
for quite some time.    
THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON
WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT
Many migrants manage to
improve their incomes, their
access to education or their per-
sonal security. This is particularly
true for people moving within or to
the Northern hemisphere. As a
result, international migration and
internal mobility in many cases
are quick ways to increase wel-
fare and opportunities for mobile
people. As a part migrants’
income is typically sent back
home, migration also has the
potential to directly improve living
conditions in migrant-sending
regions and countries. This, how-
ever, is only the second-best
choice for development, because
remittances increase the pur-
chasing power of local
households with a relative
abroad, but do not necessarily
generate local investment or jobs.
In total, international remittances
by migrant workers in 2013
amounted to an estimated
US$549 billion (World Bank,
2013). The greatest part of these
remittances went to developing
countries – some US$414 billion:
about 2.5 times the amount that
rich countries transfer as over-
sees development assistance.
The largest flows come from
migrants working in rich countries
of the global North sending
workers and has already
changed the direction of migra-
tion flows. For example, the
European countries most
affected by the financial and
economic crisis, in particular
Ireland, Greece, Portugal and
Spain, have recorded more
emigration than immigration
since 2010 (Figure 3). 
• The improving economic situa-
tion in capital cities and other
urban agglomerations of many
traditional migrant-sending
countries has created domes-
tic alternatives to international
migration. Usually this has to
do with declining population
growth and industrialisation
and the emergence of urban
service sectors absorbing rural
migrants. The impact on inter-
national migration is clearly
visible: for example, Mexico
and Turkey were for decades
both prominent sources of
immigration to the United
States and the EU, respec-
tively, but no longer play that
role. Internal mobility towards
quickly developing urban
agglomerations in these coun-
tries has become an attractive
alternative to emigration7. 
• Similarly, several emerging
economies – including Angola,
Brazil, Chile, Ivory Coast,
Malaysia and South Africa –
are attracting migrants from
neighbouring countries, open-
ing up regional alternatives for
mobile people who might oth-
erwise have looked further
afield (IOM, 2011). Neverthe-
less, many middle- and
low-income countries – such
as Bangladesh, Egypt, India,
Pakistan and the Philippines –
will continue to have youthful
and growing populations cou-
-5 or lower -5 to -2 -2 to 0 0 to +2 +2 to +5 +5 or more
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat, UN DESA, national statistics. Note: Per 1000
inhabitants. Countries with a recent change from net immigration to net emigration
(Bosnia, Croatia, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain) or from net emigration to
net immigration (Turkey) are outlined with a heavy black border.
Figure 3: Annual average net migration balances (net flows), %, 2010-12
money to households and com-
munities in the global South. 
The top receiving countries of offi-
cially recorded remittances in
2012 were India (US$71 billion),
China (US$60 billion), the Philip-
pines (US$26 billion), Mexico
(US$22 billion) and Nigeria
(US$21 billion). Other major
recipients included Egypt, Pak-
istan, Bangladesh, Vietnam and
Ukraine.
Within Europe, remit-
tances are also
important for coun-
tries with a small
GDP and a consider-
able diaspora, in
particular Albania,
Bosnia, Kosovo and
Moldova.
By giving people access to coun-
tries and regions with better
opportunities and by enabling
remittances, migration can con-
tribute to poverty reduction, but
also to increased access to edu-
cation, health services and food
security. 
In addition, over time, migrants
can become agents of change in
their home regions and countries.
Some create trade relationships;
others bring back new technolo-
gies or start to invest in their
home countries. In a number of
countries, returning migrants
have played a significant role in
promoting democracy or even in
facilitating regime change8.
With a growing demand for
migrant labour and skills in high-
income countries with ageing
populations, the welfare-
enhancing effects of international
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migration are likely to increase.
The same is true for growing
formal and informal labour
markets in urban agglomerations
of middle- and low-income
countries.
There are, however, a number of
negative aspects. Migrants are at
risk of being exploited individu-
ally or discriminated against
structurally9. Individual exploita-
tion can be experienced at the
hands of employers,
agents or traffickers.
Migrants sometimes
are charged exces-
sive commissions
for recruitment serv-
ices, when changing
money or when
sending money back
home (World Bank,
2013). Structural discrimination
is linked to labour laws of destina-
tion countries, recruitment and
promotion practices of employers
or tax and social security sys-
tems collecting contributions
from migrants, but excluding
them from certain public services
or social transfers10. At the same
time, under certain conditions,
newly-arrived migrants can have
negative effects on wages and
labour force participation of low-
skilled native workers, though the
overall economic impact of the
these migrants for the receiving
country is positive.   
International migration and mobil-
ity potentially cause brain drains
from rural peripheries to urban
centres and from low-income
countries to emerging and devel-
oped economies. This negatively
affects economic output and
wages in migrant-sending
regions. Additionally, discrimina-
tion against migrants in labour
markets of destination countries
clearly leads to brain waste and
over time to de-qualification.
Some of these risks can be
mitigated through circular and
return-migration. Other risks can
only be addressed through
setting and enforcing minimum
wage levels, social protection
levels and labour and recruitment
standards.  
IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPEAN
EMPLOYMENT AND MIGRATION
POLICIES
The changing economic and
demographic realities of the
coming decades will have major
implications for future employ-
ment and migration policies in
Europe:
• In the short term, high unem-
ployment in some parts of
Europe and a shortage of
labour and skills in other parts
should be addressed by
encouraging more mobility
between EU member states
leading to better allocation of
labour within the European
Union.
• In the medium and long terms
European countries with
ageing societies and
stagnating or declining
working-age populations will
need to invest more in sound,
forward-looking migration
policies. Many EU member
states accustomed to easily
finding the labour and skills
they require will need to think
more strategically about how
to attract qualified workers.
• Tougher competition for skills
will put more focus on the
‘Changing economic
and demographic
realities will have
major implications
for Europe's
migration policies.’
8. Diasporas can play a
crucial role in cases of
regime change because
they might include
alternative elites ready
to return.
9. See (as one of many
examples) the discus-
sion about the living
and working conditions
(including high risks of
fatal accidents) of
migrant labour in Qatar:
http://www.globalresear
ch.ca/the-world-cup-
socker-in-qatar-2022-c
ontroversy-over-the-
appalling-migrant-work
er-conditions/5353020.
10. Some of these
issues are addressed in
the International
Labour Organisation
conventions no. 143
(Migrant Workers) and
no. 189 (Domestic
Workers). It should not
be overlooked that
many sending coun-
tries are asking for
better protection of
their nationals living
and working abroad
without being prepared
to extend similar rights
to their citizens or third-
country nationals
working in their own
country.
employment of migrant labour
to supply the needed human
capital to the European labour
market. In this context, mutual
recognition of educational
attainments and acquired
skills based on comparable
standards would be extremely
helpful. More emphasis should
also be given to making
acquired social and employer
benefits fully portable. 
• More international migration
from third countries and a
greater degree of mobility
between EU countries remains
only one possible answer to
future mismatches between
supply and demand of labour
and skills. EU member states
with ageing populations must
also consider other policies to
protect the capabilities of their
workforces — such as increas-
ing the retirement age and the
labour force participation of
women.  
Bilateral or even EU-level coopera-
tion offers policymakers at all
points of the migration trajectory
— sending, transit
and receiving coun-
tries — the
opportunity to craft
smarter policies
that will be mutu-
ally beneficial and
will mitigate the
risks of migration.
However, while
most sending countries have
adopted liberal migration policies
facilitating travel and emigration,
receiving countries in Europe see
migration control as a key ele-
ment of their sovereignty. As a
result, EU member states gener-
ally have ‘unilateral’ admission
policies that are aligned neither
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11. The EU regulates
which country is
responsible for
processing asylum
claims.
12. See http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ
/site/en/com/2007/com
2007_0637en01.pdf.
13. The main exceptions
are the annual meetings
of the Global Forum on
Migration and
Development
(http://www.gfmd.org/en)
and the UN High Level
Dialogue on Migration
and Development that
took place in October
2013.
14. See footnote 1.
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with other receiving countries nor
with the main  sending countries.
As a result, bilateral agreements
or mobility partnerships only play
a minor role in most EU migration
policymaking.
This is in contrast to border man-
agement (Schengen system), for
which EU member
states share joint
responsibility, sup-
ported by a
specialised agency
(Frontex). There is
also some coordina-
tion in the field of
asylum11. The
admission of
migrant labour from third coun-
tries, however, remains fully
under the control of each EU
member state. As a consequence,
a work permit for a particular EU
country does not give access to
the common EU labour market.
Even the so-called EU ‘Blue Card’
providing access to all 28 national
labour markets has to be issued
by a particular EU member state12.
Most member states have never
issued such ‘Blue
Cards’.  
At international
level, there are few
occasions for repre-
sentatives of EU
member states to
share their views or
to find common
ground with representatives of
sending countries13 — unlike the
international dimension of policy-
making on trade, energy or
climate change. Lack of coopera-
tion between migrant-sending
and receiving countries increases
the costs of migration and
decreases the positive effect on
socio-economic development.
The direct (and sometimes exces-
sive) costs relate to visas and
passports, recruitment and travel
agencies, exchange commis-
sions, money transfer fees and
other fees. The indirect costs
relate to labour market discrimi-
nation leading to lower incomes
compared to native
workers with similar
skills, and to
reduced portability
of acquired social
rights and benefits
leading to lower (or
no) pension pay-
ments, lower health
insurance coverage
and reduced (or no) access to
unemployment benefits. 
Within the EU28 there are also a
number of barriers, including
insufficient linguistic skills,
restricted access to certain labour
market segments, even for citi-
zens of other EU countries, and
restricted portability of social
benefits. The outcome is evident.
Europe still lacks a functioning
internal labour market with suffi-
cient mobility between regions
with high and regions with low
unemployment. Furthermore, in
many European countries, there
is considerable popular scepti-
cism or even resistance to
international migration. In Febru-
ary 2014, a referendum put
forward by the conservative and
populist Swiss People’s Party in
favour of abolishing the free
movement of labour between the
EU and Switzerland, while re-intro-
ducing annual quotas for
migrants and cross-border com-
muters, was backed by 50.3
percent of the voters14. This result
is a good example of how deeply
‘Migration is only one
possible answer to
future EU mis-
matches between
supply and demand
of labour and skills.’
‘Europe still lacks a
functioning labour
market with enough
mobility between
high and low unem-
ployment regions.’
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negative sentiment against immi-
gration is entrenched even in one
of the continent’s strongest
economies.
Future migration and integration
policies should aim to reduce the
direct and indirect costs of migra-
tion. They should also aim to
maximise the possible benefits of
migration by both reducing wage
discrimination and deterring the
employment of migrants below
their skill levels. Better jobs for
migrants will directly translate
into higher wages and eventually
into higher remittances. 
We can assume that the global
competition for qualified and
therefore crucial for decision-
makers to consider and invest in
long-term solutions that can be
adapted to meet the changing
needs of their economies and
societies.
The author thanks Zoltán Bakay
and Bernadett Povazsai-Römhild
for their support in preparing this
paper, and Ramez Abbas, Natalia
Banulescu-Bogdan, Thomas
Buettner, Susan Fratzke, Stephen
Gardner and Michelle Mittelstadt
for their helpful comments. An
earlier version of this paper was
prepared by MPI (Washington DC)
for the UN High Level Dialogue on
Migration and Development
(October 2013).
skilled workers will become stiffer
in the next few decades. Europe
will have to cope with this. Greater
competition will in turn expand
the range of employment oppor-
tunities for people emigrating
from youthful and demographi-
cally growing societies.
Notwithstanding such opportuni-
ties, demographically growing
nations must continue their
efforts to create jobs at home. 
Regardless of the route European
governments choose, many poli-
cies that address demographic
change and the subsequent fun-
damental shifts in labour supply
require a time horizon well
beyond an electoral cycle. It is
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